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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants Dawn-Marie and James Hawkins (referred to 
collectively as Hawkins) appeal the District Court's 
summary judgment. It had concluded that Hawkins's 
claims that Leslie's Pool Mart (1) negligently failed "to 
provide adequate directions or precautions regarding the 
opening, closing and/or storage of the package containing 
the product" and (2) negligently failed "to package the 
product in a manner adequate to prevent excessive 
chemical decomposition, contamination, combustion, or 
generation of fumes and gases" were preempted by the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 
7 U.S.C. S 136 et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 and will exercise plenary review to determine 
whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact" such that Leslie's Pool Mart is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see Olson 
v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 




Dawn-Marie Hawkins suffered a burning sensation in her 
throat and lungs, and breathing difficulty when she opened 
a container of Leslie's Chlorinator Tablets 1<!DAG> purchased 
from Leslie's Pool Mart. Hawkins filed a diversity action in 
federal court against Leslie's Pool Mart alleging negligence, 
strict liability, breach of warranty and loss of consortium. 
Germane to this appeal, Hawkins asserts that Leslie's Pool 
Mart: 
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       * failed to warn of sudden decomposition and 
       chemical reactions which could generate harmful 
       fumes; 
 
       * failed to provide adequate directions regarding the 
       opening, closing and/or storage of the container; 
       and 
 
       * failed to package the product in a manner adequate 
       to prevent excessive decomposition contamination, 
       combustion, or generation of fumes. 
 
Compl. PP 9, 18, 21, 22 and 25; App. 2a-6a. 
 
The District Court employed the preemption analysis 
established by the Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992), and held 
that Hawkins's failure to warn claims, failure to provide 
adequate directions claims and failure to adequately 
package the product claims were preempted by FIFRA. The 
District Court reasoned that imposing liability would 
require Leslie's Pool Mart to alter the label and packaging 
approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
Hawkins appeals, relying on the Supreme Court's most 
recent case on preemption, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). 
 
On appeal, Hawkins first argues that FIFRA neither 
requires directions for opening a package nor information 
about the chemical reactivity of a pesticide be included 
therein. Appellant's Br. at 12. Second, she suggests that 
directions on a container's lid are neither required or 
approved under FIFRA nor are they registered with the 
EPA. Third, she asserts that FIFRA's regulations concerning 
directions for use are general, and therefore, her claims do 
not impose requirements that are in addition to, or different 
from, FIFRA's. As to Hawkins's defective/negligent 
packaging claim, she argues that because the EPA has 
regulated packaging only in the area of child-resistant 
packaging, her claim for defective packaging is not 
preempted. We will affirm as to the labeling based claims 




Preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. 
Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
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United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding."). The doctrine preempts state laws that 
conflict with or are contrary to federal law. See Cipollone, 
505 U.S. at 516, 112 S. Ct. at 2617. There are three types 
of preemption: express, implied and conflict preemption. 
However, these "categories are not `rigidly distinct.' " Gade 
v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 
104 n.2, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 n.2 (1992) (quoting English 
v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5, 110 S. Ct. 2270, 
2275 n.5 (1990)). Here, the language of FIFRA expressly 
preempts state law. 
 
The preemptive provision of FIFRA states: 
 
       S 136v. Authority of States 
 
       (a) In general 
 
       A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally 
       registered pesticide or device in the State, but only if 
       and to the extent the regulation does not permit any 
       sale or use prohibited by this subchapter. 
 
       (b) Uniformity 
 
       Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any 
       requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or 
       different from those required under this subchapter. 
 
7 U.S.C. S 136v. 
 
Even though "the pre-emptive language of [section 136v] 
means that we need not go beyond that language to 
determine whether Congress intended [FIFRA] to pre-empt 
at least some state law, we must nonetheless `identify the 
domain expressly pre-empted.' " Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484, 
116 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 112 
S. Ct. at 2618). To do so, we "begin with [the statute's] text" 
as "informed by two presumptions about the nature of 
preemption." Id. at 484-85, 116 S. Ct. at 2250 (citing Gade, 
505 U.S. at 111, 112 S. Ct. at 2389-90 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Thefirst 
presumption is " `that the historic police powers of the 
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States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' " Id. 
at 485, 116 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 
(1947)). The second long-standing presumption is that " `the 
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in every 
pre-emption case." Id., 116 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting Retail 
Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S. Ct. 219, 
222 (1963)). Therefore, a proper analysis of a statute's 
preemptive scope "rest[s] primarily on`a fair understanding 
of congressional purpose' " as "discerned from the language 
. . . and the `statutory framework.' " Id. at 485-86, 116 S. 
Ct. at 2250-51 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530 n.27, 
112 S. Ct. at 2624 n.27, and Gade, 505 U.S. at 111, 112 
S. Ct. at 2390 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment)). 
 
A proper analysis must also consider "the `structure and 
purpose of the statute as a whole,' as revealed not only in 
the text, but through the reviewing court's reasoned 
understanding of the way in which Congress intended the 
statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect 
business, consumers, and the law." Id. at 486, 116 S. Ct. 
at 2251 (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 98, 112 S. Ct. at 2383). 
 
In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, the Supreme 
Court concluded that section 136v of FIFRA resulted in a 
"narrow preemptive overlap" and that Congress did not 
intend "to occupy the entire field of pesticide regulation." 
501 U.S. 597, 613, 111 S. Ct. 2486 (1991). The Supreme 
Court observed, albeit in dicta, that although FIFRA was "a 
comprehensive regulatory statute," the preemption 
provision was narrow and preempted state regulation of 
labeling. Id. at 601, 111 S. Ct. at 2480 (quoting 
Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991, 104 S. Ct. 
2862, 2867 (1984)). This conclusion is supported by the 
House Committee Report on the 1972 amendments to 
FIFRA. The Report notes that "[i]n dividing the 
responsibility between the States and the Federal 
government for the management of an effective pesticide 
program, the Committee has adopted language which is 
intended to completely preempt State authority in regard to 
labeling and packaging." H.R. Rep. No. 92-511, at 16 
(1971). 
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However, the pre-emptive effect of FIFRA is dependent on 
agency regulations. See id. at 1 (explaining that "[t]he 
Federal Government sets the program standards the States 
must meet. State authority to change Federal Labeling and 
packaging is completely preempted" and noting that the 
EPA has "[g]eneral authority . . . to write regulations to 
carry out the Act and recognize the use of specialty 
chemicals"); 7 U.S.C. S 136v(a) (permitting state regulation 
of pesticides "but only if and to the extent the regulation 
does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this 
subchapter"); id. S 136v(b) (prohibiting state imposed 
labeling or packaging requirements that are "in addition to 
or different from those required under this subchapter"). 
 
We therefore begin by noting that FIFRA expressly 
preempts state imposed requirements in the areas of 
labeling and packaging that are "in addition to or different 
from those required" by the EPA. 7 U.S.C. S 136v(b). We 
also note that the term "requirements" in section 136v 
includes not only state statutory law but also state 
common-law damages claims. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 
487-88, 116 S. Ct. at 2251; see also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 
521, 112 S. Ct. at 2620 (concluding that the term 
"requirements" "sweeps broadly" and"easily encompass[es] 
obligations that take the form of common-law rules" and 
that an award of damages can be " `a potent method of 
governing conduct and controlling policy' " (quoting San 
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247, 
79 S. Ct. 773, 780 (1959))). However, that does not in turn 
automatically preclude all state common-law damages 
claims. As the Supreme Court observed in Medtronic, "if 
Congress intended to preclude all common-law causes of 
action, it chose a singularly odd word with which to do it." 
518 U.S. at 487, 116 S. Ct. at 2251. The word 
" `requirement' appears to presume that the State is 
imposing a specific duty upon the manufacturer." Id., 116 
S. Ct. at 2251. If Congress's true intention was to preclude 
all common law causes of action, it could have stated that 
all remedies, rather than requirements, under state law 
pertaining to pesticides, fungicides and rodenticides are 
precluded. Cf. id. at 487-88, 116 S. Ct. at 2251. 
 
A. Labeling Claims 
 
Although FIFRA's language is fairly general as to some 
aspects of pesticide regulation, EPA rules and regulations 
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set forth specific labeling requirements. See  40 C.F.R. 
S 156.10; Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co. , 715 A.2d 967, 
973 (N.J. 1998) (noting that "[a]lthough FIFRA does not 
prescribe the exact contents of labels, manufacturers are 
not free . . . to create pesticide labels in any manner they 
choose. . . . FIFRA cannot impose a specific requirement for 
warning labels like the 1969 Cigarette Act because FIFRA 
regulates a wide variety of products that cannot be serviced 
by a single statement."). The EPA requirements address, 
inter alia, label contents and proper label placement. 
Required warning and precautionary statements are based 
in part, on the toxicity of the pesticide. The EPA has 
established "typical precautionary statements" for the 
different categories of toxicity. 40 C.F.R.S 156.10(h)(2)(i)(B). 
However, "[t]hese statements must be modified or expanded 
to reflect specific hazards." Id. Thus, Hawkins's claim that 
Leslie's Pool Mart failed to warn of sudden decomposition 
and sudden reactivity of the pesticide is, on its face, 
preempted by the pesticide-specific labeling requirements 
established by the EPA. 
 
Hawkins contends that her "claims based on failure to 
provide adequate directions for opening and closing the 
container are not preempted because they do not impose 
requirements that are different from or in addition to 
federal requirements." Appellant's Br. at 6. We disagree. 
 
First, " `labeling' means all labels and all other written, 
printed, or graphic matter . . . accompanying the pesticide or 
device at any time." 7 U.S.C. S 136(p)(2) (emphasis added). 
Thus, a plain reading of the statute reveals that Congress 
intended the term "labeling" to include all printed matter-- 
whether appearing on a front or back "label" or some other 
portion of the container. Hawkins attempts to make the 
distinction that her claim is based not on the label, but on 
instructions placed on the lid of the container. We reject 
such a hair-splitting reading of the statute, and instead 
conclude that, under a literal reading of FIFRA, labeling 
requirements include any and all printed matter that 
"accompan[ies] the pesticide." Id.  
 
Hawkins also argues that "[t]he applicability of 
[Medtronic's] logic to this case is inescapable" because the 
language of FIFRA "is virtually identical" to that of the 
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Medical Device Amendments.1 Appellant's Br. at 11. 
However, even assuming that FIFRA is analogous to the 
Medical Device Amendments addressed by the Supreme 
Court in Medtronic, contrary to Hawkins's assertions, we do 
not read that case as standing for the overarching premise 
that tort claims fall outside "preempted requirements." 
Further, the Court's holding in Medtronic does not alter our 
analysis as to Hawkins's labeling-based claims. In 
Medtronic, the Food and Drug Administration approved a 
pacemaker device without performing an extensive 
evaluation. See 518 U.S. at 480, 116 S. Ct. at 2248. In 
stark contrast, here the EPA withheld approval of the 
chlorinator tablets and accompanying labels until Leslie's 
Pool Mart incorporated specific labeling language mandated 
by the EPA. For example, in 1975, the EPA approved the 
following language for Leslie's chlorinator tablets 1<!DAG> labels 
and warning: 
 
       DANGER: KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN. 
 
       Corrosive, causes eye damage. May be fatal if 
       swallowed. Do not get in eyes, on skin or on clothing. 
       Irritating to nose and throat. Avoid breathing dust. May 
       cause burns to broken skin. Wash hands after 
       handling. 
 
       DANGER: STRONG OXIDIZING AGENT. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The preemptive provision of the Medical Device Amendments Act 
states in pertinent part: 
 
       (a) General rule 
 
       Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or 
       political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in 
effect 
       with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-- 
 
       (1) which is different form, or in addition to, any requirement 
       applicable under this chapter to the device, and 
 
       (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the ddAdevice 
or 
       to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the 
       device under this chapter. 
 
21 U.S.C. S 360k(a). Subchapter (b) then lists the exempted 
requirements. See id. S 360k(b). 
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       Mix only with water. Use clean dry utensils. 
       Contamination by moisture, organic matter, or other 
       chemicals may liberate hazardous gases. Store in cool, 
       dry, well-ventilated area away form heat or openflame. 
       Decomposes at 350F with liberation of harmful gases.  
       In case of decomposition, if possible, isolate container 
       in open air. Flood with large amounts of water. Keep 
       container tightly closed when not in use. Rinse empty 
       container thoroughly with water to dissolve all material 
       before discarding. 
 
App. at 15a (emphasis added). In 1988, the EPA notified 
Leslie's Pool Mart that its labeling was unacceptable and 
needed to be revised to read as follows: 
 
       Danger: corrosive. Causes eye and skin damage. Do 
       not get in eyes, on skin or on clothing. Wear goggles 
       and rubber gloves when handling. Harmful if 
       swallowed. Avoid breathing dust. Wash thoroughly with 
       soap and water after handling. 
 
App. 35a (emphasis added). Finally, in 1994, the EPA again 
changed the wording requirements to read: 
 
       CORROSIVE: Causes irreversible eye damage and skin 
       burns. May be fatal if absorbed through skin. May be 
       fatal if inhaled. Do not breathe dust or spray mists. 
       Irritating to nose and throat. Harmful if swallowed. Do 
       not get in eyes, on skin, or on clothing. Wear goggles 
       or face shield, protective clothing and rubber gloves 
       when handling this product. Wash thoroughly with 
       soap and water after handling and before eating, 
       drinking or using tobacco. Remove contaminated 
       clothing and wash before reuse. 
 
App. 58a (emphasis added). 
 
Additionally, in 1994, the EPA approved the following 
language concerning the storage and disposal of the 
chlorinator tablets: 
 
       STORAGE AND DISPOSAL: Do not contaminate water, 
       food, or feed by storage or disposal. Keep product dry 
       in tightly closed container when not in use. Store in cool 
       dry, well ventilated area away from heat or openflame 
       . . . 
 
                                9 
  
app. at 38a (emphasis added), and the following 
precautionary statements under the heading "Physical or 
Chemical Hazards: Strong Oxidizing Agent": 
 
       Mix only with water. Use clean dry utensils. Do not add 
       this product to any dispensing device containing 
       remnants of any other product. Such use may cause a 
       violent reaction leading to fire or explosion. 
       Contamination with moisture, organic matter, or other 
       chemicals may start a chemical reaction, with 
       generation of heat, liberation of hazardous gases, and 
       possible generation of fire and explosion. In case of 
       contamination or decomposition, do not reseal container. 
       If possible isolate container in open air or well 
       ventilated area. Flood with large volumes of water if 
       necessary. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). The Record shows that each time the 
EPA evaluated the labels and made recommendations 
pertaining to the language on the labels, Leslie's Pool Mart 
cooperated with the EPA and changed the labels as 
instructed. 
 
"In sum, the EPA's requirements for labeling pesticides 
are sufficiently specific to mandate preemption of claims 
based on state statutes or common law." Lewis, 715 A.2d 
at 973; see also Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 
560 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[U]nder 7 U.S.C. S 136a(c)(5), the EPA 
approves each label only after a careful review of the 
product data and the draft label. FIFRA cannot impose a 
specific language requirement for warning labels like the 
1969 Cigarette Act because FIFRA regulates a wide variety 
of products that cannot be serviced by a single statement."). 
The EPA categorizes each pesticide according to its toxicity 
and then sets forth the warning language required on the 
pesticide's label. See Lewis, 715 A.2d at 973. FIFRA 
disallows any changes to an EPA-approved label unless the 
EPA approves the change. This absolute control of labeling 
regulation indicates that Hawkins's claim that labeling 
different from that approved by the EPA should have been 
included on the container is preempted.2  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This conclusion "comports with the decisions of an overwhelming 
majority of federal and state courts that have interpreted the extent of 
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Moreover, Hawkins mischaracterizes the EPA labeling 
requirements concerning directions for use. We agree that 
the General Requirements are just that--general. 3 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
FIFRA preemption in light of Medtronic." Lewis, 715 A.2d at 973 (citing 
Kuiper v. American Cyanamid Co., 131 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 1997), 
and Grenier v. Vermont Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559, 563-64 (1st Cir. 
1996)); see, e.g., Taylor AG Indus., 54 F.3d at 561; Welchert v. American 
Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69, 73 (8th Cir. 1995); Lowe v. Sporicidin Int'l, 
47 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 1995); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 
1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1994); Papas v. Upjohn Co. , 985 F.2d 516, 518 
(11th Cir. 1993); Arkansas-Platte & Gule Partnership v. Van Waters & 
Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 
3. The General Requirements mandate: 
 
       (i) Adequacy and clarity of directions. Directions for use must be 
       stated in terms which can be easily read and understood by the 
       average person likely to use or to supervise the use of the 
pesticide. 
       When followed, directions must be adequate to protect the public 
       from fraud and from personal injury and to prevent unreasonable 
       adverse effects on the environment. 
 
       (ii) Placement of directions for use. Directions may appear on any 
       portion of the label provided that the are conspicuous enough to be 
       easily read by the user of the pesticide product 
 
       . . . 
 
       (2) Contents of Directions for Use. The directions for use shall 
       include the following, under the headings "Directions for Use" 
 
       (i) The statement of use classification . . . 
 
       (ii) Immediately below the statement of use classification, the 
       statement "It is a violation of Federal law to use this product in 
a 
       manner inconsistent with its labeling" 
 
       . . . 
 
       (ix) specific directions concerning the storage and disposal of the 
       pesticide and its container . . . . These instructions shall be 
grouped 
       and appear under the heading "Storage and disposal." This heading 
       must be set in type of the same minimum sizes as required for the 
       child hazard warning 
 
       (x)(F) Other pertinent information which the Administrator 
       determines to be necessary for the protection of man and the 
       environment. 
 
40 CFR S 156.10. 
 
                                11 
  
record, however, makes clear that the EPA scrutinized 
Leslie's Pool Mart's proposed labels, and withheld approval 
until the required language was incorporated. Therefore, we 
agree with Leslie's Pool Mart's observation that"[h]ad the 
EPA felt that additional language on the opening, closing, 
storage or use of the tablets was necessary, it would have 
required that Leslie's include such language." Appellee's Br. 
at 19 n.7. 
 
Finally, Hawkins asserts that her labeling claims relate to 
areas not addressed by FIFRA or the EPA regulations 
because "[n]owhere do the regulations address the 
appropriate directions for opening a package in any given 
condition." Appellant's Br. at 12. We disagree. The EPA- 
mandated and approved language on the labels specifically 
instructed the user on protective actions to take when 
opening the container and using the pesticide. Among the 
federal requirements are directions for the proper storage 
and disposal of the product and the potential reactivity of 
the product. These instructions necessarily implicate 
"opening instructions." Although the approved instructions 
and warnings do not specify how the user is to pry the lid 
off the container, they do instruct the user to avoid 
breathing any fumes and to wear protective clothing and a 
face shield or eye goggles. Again, the comprehensiveness of 
the regulations leads us to conclude that Hawkins's 
labeling claims are preempted. To hold otherwise would be 
to impose labeling requirements additional to those 
mandated by the EPA. See Welchert v. American Cyanamid, 
Inc., 59 F.3d 69, 73 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Where Congress has 
so clearly put pesticide labeling regulation in the hands of 
the EPA, [a] claim challenging the accuracy of the . . . 
label's federally-mandated and approved statement cannot 
survive. To hold otherwise would be to allow state courts to 
sit, in effect, as super-EPA review boards that could 
question the adequacy of the EPA's determination of 
whether a pesticide registrant successfully complied with 
the specific labeling requirements of its own regulations."). 
 
B. Defective Packaging Claims 
 
Hawkins also alleges that Leslie's Pool Mart "negligent[ly] 
fail[ed] to package the product in a manner adequate to 
prevent excessive chemical decomposition, contamination, 
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combustion, or generation of fumes and gases." Compl. 
P 18(c); App. at 4a. During oral argument, Hawkins 
contended that Leslie's Pool Mart's failure to individually 
wrap the chlorinator tablets facilitated the generation of 
fumes. The District Court read section 136v as preempting 
all state law claims based on packaging and labeling. 
Accordingly, the District Court granted summary judgment 
for Leslie's Pool Mart. On appeal, Hawkins asserts that 
because the only area of packaging the EPA has regulated 
is child-resistant packaging, her claims alleging inadequate 
packaging would not impose a requirement in addition to, 
or different from, federal packaging requirements. 
Therefore, Hawkins argues, the preemption doctrine does 
not apply. 
 
Leslie's Pool Mart responds that the EPA's limited 
exercise of authority is of no consequence to the broad 
preemptive scope of FIFRA. Leslie's Pool Mart argues that 
because section 136v specifically mentions state imposed 
labeling and packaging requirements, these areas are the 
"exclusive domain" of the federal government and any state 
requirement concerning labeling or packaging is preempted. 
Thus, our task is to determine whether the scope of federal 
preemption of packaging claims under FIFRA is limited to 
the discrete area of child-resistant packaging when the EPA 
has not evaluated and approved the packaging methods in 
dispute. 
 
Once again, we begin our preemption analysis by 
identifying the domain preempted. When identifying the 
domain preempted, we first acknowledge that the text of 
FIFRA makes it clear that the EPA has authority to regulate 
all aspects of packaging. See 7 U.S.C. S 136q(e) (stating that 
the Administrator of the EPA "shall . . . promulgate 
regulations for the design of pesticide containers that will 
promote safe storage and disposal of pesticides"); id. 
S 136w(a)(1) (authorizing the Administrator of the EPA "to 
prescribe regulations to carry out the provisions of[FIFRA]"; 
id. S 136w(c)(3) (authorizing the Administrator of the EPA 
"to establish standards . . . with respect to the package, 
container, or wrapping in which a pesticide or device is 
enclosed for use or consumption, in order to protect 
children and adults from serious injury or illness resulting 
 
                                13 
  
from accidental ingestion or contact with pesticides or 
devices regulated by this subchapter as well as to 
accomplish the other purposes of this subchapter"). We 
also consult FIFRA's legislative history to glean Congress's 
intent. The legislative history notes that "Subsection (b) [of 
section 136v] preempts any State labeling or packaging 
requirements differing from such requirements under the 
Act." Sen. Rep. No. 92-838 (1972) reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 4021 (emphasis added). It also allows 
for the inference that state and federal labeling and 
packaging requirements might coexist. See id.  at 4111 
(commenting that "[t]he amended language would prohibit 
local governments from imposing requirements as to 
labeling and packaging which differ from those imposed by 
Federal and State authorities (emphasis added)). Finally, we 
must also consider the appropriate EPA regulations 
because, as explained supra, the preemptive reach of FIFRA 
is dependent on agency regulations. 
 
With these guideposts, we now turn to the pertinent 
federal statutes and regulations. In contrast to the 
numerous regulations and statutes governing pesticide 
labeling requirements, only one EPA regulation governs 
pesticide packaging. See 40 C.F.R. S 157.20. Section 157.20 
states in pertinent part: 
 
       This subpart prescribes requirements for child-resistant 
       packaging of pesticide products and devices. The 
       requirements are established under the authority of 
       FIFRA section 25(a)(1)4, which authorizes the 
       Administrator to issue regulations to carry out the 
       purposes of the Act, and FIFRA section 25(c)(3) 5, which 
       authorizes the Administrator to establish standards 
       with respect to the package, container or wrapping in 
       which a pesticide or device is enclosed in order to 
       protect children and adults from serious injury or 
       illness resulting from accidental ingestion or contact 
       with pesticides or devices regulated under the Act. 
 
Id. Accordingly, despite a potentially broad scope of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. FIFRA section 25(a)(1) can be found at 7 U.S.C. S 136w(a)(1). 
 
5. FIFRA section 25(c)(3) can be found at 7 U.S.C. S 136w(c)(3). 
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authority, the EPA has thus far limited its exercise of power 
to the area of child-resistant packaging. We conclude that 
this limited exercise of power is significant and seriously 
undermines Leslie's Pool Mart's argument. In sum, we hold 
that where, as here, a preemption provision is dependent 
on government regulations, we cannot extend the reach of 
that provision to areas not actively regulated by the federal 
government. In other words, the EPA's failure to promulgate 
packaging regulations outside the area of child-resistant 
packaging is fatal to Leslie's Pool Mart's preemption 
argument. When no federal packaging requirements have 
been established, logic dictates that a state law packaging 
requirement cannot be different from or in addition to the 
absent federal requirement. We believe this decision is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement 
on preemption in Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 470, 116 S. Ct. at 
2240 (1996).6 
 
In Medtronic, the Court analyzed the preemptive effect of 
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 on state law 
claims for common-law negligence and strict liability 
brought against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective 
pacemaker. See id. at 474, 116 S. Ct. at 2245. The Court 
concluded that defective design claims were not preempted 
even though the Food and Drug Administration approved 
the pacemaker. See id. at 492, 116 S. Ct. at 2254. The 
Court reached its decision after noting that the Food and 
Drug Administration "did not `require' Medtronic's 
pacemaker to take any particular form for any particular 
reason; the agency simply allowed the pacemaker, as a 
device substantially equivalent to one that existed before 
1976, to be marketed without running the gauntlet of the 
[premarket approval] process." Id. at 494-95, 116 S. Ct. at 
2254. As such, the federal requirements did not reflect "an 
unambiguous conclusion" that was reached after a 
deliberate weighing of competing interests. Id. at 501, 116 
S. Ct. at 2258. Rather, the requirements "reflect[ed] 
important but entirely generic concerns about device 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Our reliance on Medtronic should not be read as implying that the 
Supreme Court effectively overruled Cipollone. To the contrary, Cipollone 
remains good law and provides the basic background for preemption 
analysis. 
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regulation generally." Id., 116 S. Ct. at 2258. Therefore, the 
recipient's manufacturing and labeling based claims were 
not preempted. We read Medtronic as instructing that only 
when the "Federal Government has weighed the competing 
interests . . . [and] reached an unambiguous conclusion 
about how those competing considerations should be 
resolved in a particular cases . . . and implemented that 
conclusion via a specific mandate" are general state 
common-law claims preempted. Id., 116 S. Ct. at 2258. 
 
Here, the record reveals no evidence that the EPA 
considered the packaging methods at issue. Additionally, it 
is undisputed that no federal requirements exist in the area 
of pesticide packaging, exclusive of child-resistant 
packaging. Accordingly, we will not infer that the EPA 
approved the packaging for the chlorinator tablets after 
weighing the competing interests and reaching an 
"unambiguous conclusion." Therefore, in keeping with the 
reasoning underlying the Supreme Court's decision in 
Medtronic, we conclude that allowing Hawkins's defective 
packaging claims would not impose state law requirements 
that are in addition to or different from federal regulations. 
We recognize that our holding might be viewed as 
conflicting with Lowe v. Sporicidin International, 47 F.3d 
124, 129 (4th Cir. 1995), Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 
5 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir. 1993), and Papas v. Upjohn Co., 
985 F.2d 516, 518 (11th Cir. 1993). However, none of these 
cases was decided after the Supreme Court's decision in 
Medtronic. Moreover, these cases do not stand for the 
blanket proposition that all packaging claims are 
preempted. In Lowe, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
limited its mention of defective packaging based claims to 
the comments that "any state law claim that would require 
the defendant to alter its EPA-approved warning label, 
labeling, or packaging to avoid liability is preempted." 47 
F.3d at 129. In Worm, the court focused on failure to warn 
and labeling requirements, not design requirements. 
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Papas 
limited its discussion of defective packaging to labels 
and/or warnings located on the package and concluded 
that "to the extent [those] claims require a showing that 
[the defendant's] labeling or packaging `should have 
included additional, or more clearly stated, warnings, those 
 
                                16 
  
claims are pre-empted.' " 985 F.2d at 518 (quoting 
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524, 112 S. Ct. at 2621). 7 
 
Except for these cases that peripherally mention 
preemption of packaging claims, no courts of appeal have 
addressed the preemptive reach of FIFRA to allegations of 
inadequate packaging. Despite Leslie's Pool Mart's 
contention that all packaging claims are preempted, we 
conclude that unless the EPA has specifically considered 
the packaging methods for a pesticide product, the domain 
preempted is the narrow area of child-resistant packaging. 





The preemption provision of FIFRA, attendant EPA rules 
and regulations, and the Supreme Court's decision in 
Medtronic guide our analysis of whether the labeling and 
packaging based claims are preempted. Hawkins's claim 
that Leslie's Pool Mart failed to adequately warn about the 
sudden decomposition of chlorinator tablets is expressly 
preempted by EPA regulations. Further, Hawkins's claim 
that Leslie's Pool Mart failed to provide appropriate 
directions concerning the opening of the container falls 
within the realm of pesticide labeling. Because the EPA 
carefully reviewed all printed matter that accompanied the 
chlorinator tablets and even mandated specific language, 
allowing this claim would impose a state requirement in 
addition to or different from federal labeling regulations. 
 
In contrast, the EPA has chosen to regulate only the area 
of child-resistant packaging. We are unwilling to hold that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. As an alternative argument, Leslie's Pool Mart contends that although 
Hawkins couches her claim as "defective packaging," it is actually a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the precautionary and warning statements 
contained on the labels and packaging and is therefore preempted by 
FIFRA. Appellee's Br. at 24. This argument is unavailing and Leslie's 
Pool Mart's interpretation of Hawkins's claim is misleading. The 
Complaint specifically accuses Leslie's Pool Mart of failing to package 
the 
product in a manner adequate to prevent excessive decomposition, 
contamination, combustion, or generation of fumes. See Compl. P 18(c); 
App. 4a. 
 
                                17 
  
an area is preempted when the government has not acted 
in that particular area. Therefore, we will not construe the 
preemption provision of FIFRA so broadly as to preclude 
Hawkins's packaging based claims. Accordingly, we affirm 
that portion of the District Court's order that the labeling 
claims are preempted by FIFRA and reverse as to the 
packaging claims. 
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MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Although I join in Parts I (except as to its affirmance as 
to labeling-based claims) and II(B) of the majority's opinion 
and agree with the majority's holding in Part II(A) that 
claims based on labeling actually reviewed and approved by 
the Environmental Protection Agency and claims based on 
matters addressed therein are preempted under the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, I must 
nonetheless dissent from the majority's determination that 
Plaintiffs-Appellants' (collectively, "Hawkins") claims based 
on opening directions on the top of the package are also 
preempted. 
 
Hawkins contends that Mrs. Hawkins was injured as a 
result of following allegedly faulty opening instructions 
provided on the top of the container of pool chlorinator 
tablets supplied by Defendant-Appellee Leslie's Pool Mart 
("Leslie's").1 The majority rejects Hawkins's attempt to 
distinguish these instructions from other package labeling 
as "hair-splitting" because, under FIFRA,"labeling" 
includes all "written, printed or graphic matter" 
accompanying the product, wherever it appears on the  
container.2 While it is undoubtedly true that the 
instructions on the top of the package constitute labeling 
and are subject to EPA regulation under FIFRA, I believe 
that the majority has misconstrued Hawkins's argument. 
Hawkins contends that claims based on the package top 
opening instructions escape preemption not because of the 
instructions' location but because they were never reviewed 
and approved by the EPA. 
 
The majority appears to have rejected Hawkins's real 
argument concerning the opening instructions on factual, 
rather than legal, grounds. According to the majority, "[t]he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The printed material on top of the container begins with the following: 
 
TO OPEN: 
PLACE COIN IN GROOVE - 
PRY AND LIFT LID OFF 
 
2. See Majority Opinion at p. 7 (rejecting Hawkins's "attempt[ ] to make 
the distinction that her claim is based not on the label, but on 
instructions placed on the lid of the container"). 
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record . . . makes clear that the EPA scrutinized Leslie's 
Pool Mart's proposed labels . . . ." Majority Opinion at pp. 
11-12; see also Majority Opinion at p. 17 ("[T]he EPA 
carefully reviewed all printed matter that accompanied the 
chlorinator tablets . . . .").3 There is, however, no 
demonstration in the record that the EPA reviewed and 
approved the package top instructions at issue. As the 
party with the burden of proof on its affirmative defense of 
preemption,4 Leslie's is responsible for this deficiency in the 
record. Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
254 (1986) (on motion for summary judgment, evidence is 
to be read in light most favorable to the non-moving party).5 
Moreover, Hawkins expressly asserts that the top opening 
instructions were not part of the EPA approved labeling,6 
and Leslie's has not disputed this assertion.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. But see Majority Opinion at p. 12 (acknowledging that "the approved 
instructions and warnings do not specify how the user is to pry the lid 
off the container"). 
 
4. See, e.g., Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 n.7 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 807 (1995) (recognizing that federal 
preemption is affirmative defense as to which defendant has burden of 
proof). 
 
5. See also Avirgan v. Hull, 691 F. Supp. 1357, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 1988) 
(when defendant moving for summary judgment bears burden of proof 
because he is asserting affirmative defense, "he must establish beyond 
peradventure all of the essential elements of the . . . defense to warrant 
judgment in his favor"). 
 
6. See Brief of Appellants at 12 (alleging that front and back EPA- 
registered labels do not refer to opening or closing, while the package 
lid 
instructions - not registered with the EPA - do). Hawkins specifically 
asserts that "The allegedly defective directions on the lid are neither 
required nor approved under FIFRA, nor registered with EPA." Id. 
7. Indeed, the documentation provided by Leslie's in its Appendix 
appears to support Hawkins's assertion. See Appendix at 13a-16a 
(Affidavit of Cynthia G. Watts, Leslie's Vice President and General 
Counsel, attaching as Exhibit A "a true and accurate copy of the original 
label for Leslie's Chlorinator Tablets 1<!DAG> approved by the EPA in 
August 
1975"). Exhibit A consists of two pages (15a-16a)- the front and back 
labels of the container, each stamped as "ACCEPTED" under FIFRA on 
August 19, 1975; Appendix at 37a-39a (a portion of Exhibit C, 
correspondence from the EPA during Leslie's process of modifying and 
reregistering its labels, showing that Leslie's Certification with Respect 
to 
Citation of Data submitted in its application for registration attached 
two 
labels only - front and back); Appendix at 60a-62a (Exhibit E, the EPA's 
Notice of Reregistration issued on June 20, 1994, which again contains 
two labels only - front and back). 
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In the present posture of this case, i.e., on review of 
summary judgment, I believe we must assume that the 
package top instructions were not reviewed and approved 
by the EPA. Thus, EPA approval gave rise to requirements 
only with respect to the storage and general handling 
instructions on the approved labels. Because no statutory 
or regulatory provision governs the content of opening 
instructions, I would hold that in the absence of agency 
review and approval there is no applicable federal 
"requirement" to which a state law duty as to claims for 
faulty opening instructions may be different or additional, 
and therefore there is no preemption under FIFRA. 8 
Moreover, as the majority indicates and as Leslie's 
concedes, the inclusion of unapproved labeling material - 
unilaterally added by the manufacturer - is itself a violation 
of FIFRA and its implementing regulations.9 State law 
causes of action which provide a remedy for conduct that 
violates FIFRA are not preempted. See, Worm v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 748 (4th Cir. 1993) ("If a state 
elects to recognize that a breach of a FIFRA-created duty 
forms the basis for a state remedy, . . . it is permitted to do 
so by 7 U.S.C. S 136v(b).").10  Cf. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 495 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (holding that 
preemption depends upon agency promulgation of a relevant 
requirement); see also Majority Opinion at p. 6 (explaining that "pre- 
emptive effect of FIFRA is dependent on agency regulations"); 7 U.S.C. 
S136v(b) (prohibiting state imposed labeling or packaging requirements 
that are "in addition to or different from those required under this 
subchapter"). 
 
9. See Brief of Appellee at 11 (citing 7 U.S.C. S 136j(a)(2)(A) and 
observing 
that "Thus, no one in the chain of commerce is free to add additional 
warnings, information or instructions on its own after a particular label 
has been approved by the EPA."); see also Majority Opinion at p. 10 
("FIFRA disallows any changes to any EPA-approved label unless the 
EPA approves the change."). 
 
10. See also Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 741 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(following Worm in concluding that FHSA does not preempt claim for 
non-compliance with federally mandated labeling requirements); Nat'l 
Bank of Commerce of El Dorado v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 
993 (8th Cir. 1994) ("We agree with the conclusions of the Worm and 
Moss courts and of the district courts cited above that when a statute 
only preempts state requirements that are different from or in addition 
to those imposed by federal law, plaintiffs may still recover under state 
tort law when defendants fail to comply with federal requirements."). 
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("The presence of a damages remedy does not amount to 
the additional or different `requirement' that is necessary 
under the statute; rather, it merely provides another reason 
for manufacturers to comply with identical existing 
`requirements' under federal law."). 
 
For these reasons, I believe that Hawkins should be 
permitted on remand to pursue claims based on the 
opening instructions if indeed they were not reviewed and 
approved by the EPA. I express no opinion on whether 
Hawkins would be able to establish that a defect in those 
instructions caused her injuries. Because I conclude, 
however, that FIFRA does not preempt such a claim in 
these circumstances, I respectfully dissent from this aspect 
of the majority's opinion. 
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